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A STRUGGLE OF FOREIGN POLICY, STATE POWER,
AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FACULTY SENATE OF
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY V. FLORIDA
Joy Blanchard∗
I. INTRODUCTION
. . . It is highly needful, in the interest of society at large, that
what purport to be the conclusions of men trained for, and
dedicated to, the quest for truth, shall in fact be the
conclusions of such men, and not echoes of the opinions of the
lay public, or of the individuals who endow or manage
universities.
–1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Academic Tenure1

Academic freedom, though one of the most venerated
principles in academe,2 is a somewhat amorphous notion3—
particularly as the ways in which schools deliver knowledge,4
∗ Joy Blanchard is an Assistant Professor of Higher Education at Florida International
University. Honors B.S., University of Louisiana at Lafayette; M.S., Florida State University; Ph.D., University of Georgia. Sincere thanks to Professor David Rabban and
Professor David Hollinger for their most helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1
Edwin R. A. Seligman et al., General Report of the Committee on Academic
Freedom and Academic Tenure, BULL. AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS, Vol. 1, No. 1, at 15, 25
(Dec. 1915) available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40216731 [hereinafter 1915 Declaration].
2
Courts often defer to the de facto rights granted by the American Association
of University Professors through the organization’s various statements on academic
freedom, tenure, copyright, and collective bargaining. See, e.g., Donna R. Euben, De
Facto Tenure (2005), AAUP (July 2005), http://www.aaup.org/issues/tenure//de-factotenure-2005.
3
Whether academic freedom belongs to the faculty or institution is a continual
debate. Also, whether it truly is a constitutional issue or simply de facto practice
stemming from AAUP standards and policy statements is currently debated. See, e.g.,
David M. Rabban, Academic Freedom, Individual or Institutional?, 87 ACADEME 16
(2001).
4
Institutions such as Columbia University and New York University have
spent millions in online education without success. Increasingly, universities are using
online education as a tool to increase revenue from enrollment without having to increase infrastructure. See Michael W. Klein, ‘The Equitable Rule’: Copyright Ownership

187

Blanchard Macro.docx (Do Not Delete)

188

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

5/27/14 9:54 PM

[2014

govern, and fund themselves5 continually evolve. With the
changing nature of academe, both institutional policy and
jurisprudential thought have changed.
Since the McCarthy-era landmark cases of the 1950s,6
faculty have won rights via broad interpretations of the
Constitution and judicial deference to the notion of academic
freedom. However, some of those rights won in court (e.g., the
right to free speech as a private citizen or pundit7) as well as
rights venerated in practice (e.g., ownership of course materials
and copyrightable works8) have become blurred as the nature
of academe, governance structures, and legal opinions have
shifted. One controlling question today is whether academic
freedom is a right of the faculty or of the institution.9
In Florida, interpretations of a controversial state law are
an example in which the custom of free inquiry has been
challenged. In 2006, then-Governor Jeb Bush signed into law
what is commonly referred to as the Travel Act (“the Act”),10
which prohibits the use of state funds to sponsor research or
travel to countries designated by the U.S. Department of State
of Distance-Education Courses, 31 J.C. & U.L. 143, 174 (2004).
5
State universities are receiving fewer funds from legislatures. Increasingly,
universities are asked to become “privatized” and seek support through “soft money,”
such as grants, private donations, and commercialized inventions. See, e.g., DAVID L.
KIRP, SHAKESPEARE, EINSTEIN, AND THE BOTTOM LINE: THE MARKETING OF HIGHER
EDUCATION (Harvard University Press 2004).
6
See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (ruling that a New York
statute that allowed public school teachers to be dismissed because of their affiliation
with subversive organizations was constitutional); Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234 (1957)
(finding that the investigation of a professor’s political associations was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (overturning a state law requiring public university professors to sign affidavits that they were
not members of the Communist Party).
7
The line of cases regarding the free speech rights of public employees began
with Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (establishing a three-prong test that
grants more rights to employees the closer their speech is to a matter of public concern)
and has been most recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that the closer the nexus of an employee’s speech to the
terms of employment, the less right to free speech he enjoys).
8
There is a de facto “teacher exception” to the work for hire doctrine under the
Copyright Act that grants faculty members rights to their class notes, courses, and creative works. See generally Joy Blanchard, The Teacher Exception Under the Work for
Hire Doctrine: Safeguard of Academic Freedom or Vehicle for Academic Free Enterprise?, 35 INNOVATIVE HIGHER EDUC. 61 (2010).
9
In 2000, the Fourth Circuit upheld a Virginia statute that prohibited professors from accessing sexually explicit materials on state-owned computers without prior
consent, holding that any rights via academic freedom belonged to the university, not
to the individual professors. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000).
10
See Fla. Stat. §1011.90(6); Fla. Stat. §112.061(3)(e) (2011).
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as sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and
Syria. The language of the Act is so broad that it has been
interpreted to prohibit research sponsored by federal grants or
by funds from private donors because processing the awards
and paperwork would involve state resources.11 The Florida
Travel Act compromises basic notions of academic freedom by
taking academic decision-making ability from universities and
giving it to the legislature.
This paper will examine the legal and historical
antecedents of academic freedom, particularly the tradition
held by courts to defer to institutions on academic decisions.
The paper will then examine the case challenging Florida’s
Travel Act, discuss a 2013 ruling from the 11th Circuit that
conflicts with the court’s stance regarding the Act, and argue
why this statute should have been stricken by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
II. BACKGROUND ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM
“Academic freedom is conceived of as the price the public
must pay in return for the social good of advancing
knowledge.”12 However, well into the start of the 20th century,
presidents of American universities dismissed faculty who held
unpopular beliefs.13 With the advent of modernism and
advances in science, American academe finally began to
embrace the notion of individuality in a quest for knowledge

Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l U. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010).
See Robert Post, The Structure of Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 73 (Beshara Doumani ed., Zone Books 2006).
13
During World War I, professors were often fired for pacifist views. See, e.g.,
Rachel E Fugate, Choppy Waters are Forecast for Academic Free Speech, 26 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 187, 189 (1998); R. Kenton Bird & Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Academic Freedom and 9/11: How the War on Terrorism Threatens Free Speech on Campus, 7 COMM.
L. & POL’Y 431, 447 (2002); Jennifer Elrod, Academics, Public Employee Speech, and the
Public University, 22 BUFF. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 1, 14 (2003). At Stanford University,
Mrs. Leland Stanford called for the dismissal of a professor who supported the free silver market and denounced Asian immigration in favor of Anglo-Saxon purity; this was
a major impetus for the start of the American Association of University Professors. See,
e.g., Sonya G. Smith, Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College: The Scope of Academic
Freedom Within the Context of Sexual Harassment Claims and In-Class Speech, 25 J.
OF C. & U L. 1 (1998). The first president of Harvard resigned over controversy surrounding infant baptism and antebellum professors were fired over their opinions of
slavery. See TIMOTHY REESE CAIN, ESTABLISHING ACADEMIC FREEDOM: POLITICS,
PRINCIPLES, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORE VALUES 2, 4−7 (Palgrave Macmillan
2012).
11
12
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and truth. Taken from the German concepts of Lehrreiheit
(freedom to teach), Lernfreiheit (freedom to learn), and Freiheit
der Wissenschaft (academic self-governance),14 the 1915
Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic
Tenure issued by the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) has become a de facto creed within higher
education.15
In 1952, the term “academic freedom” was first recognized
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Adler v. Board of Education.16 In
their dissent, Justices Douglas and Black decried the New York
public school loyalty oaths: “There can be no real academic
freedom . . . . [W]here suspicion fills the air and holds scholars
in line for fear of their jobs, there can be no free exercise of
intellect. Supineness and dogmatism take the place of
inquiry.”17 In 1957, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,18 the “four
essential freedoms” of the academy were first set forth: who
may teach, what will be taught, how it will be taught, and who
will be admitted.19 The Court famously stated
[t]o impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our
Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended
by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made . . . .
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and
die.20

14
See, e.g., Stacy E. Smith, Who Owns Academic Freedom?: The Standard for
Academic Free Speech at Public Universities, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 299, 309 (2002).
Academic self-government, Freiheit der Wissenschaft, was espoused to counter the
threat of censorship. See Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1270 (1988).
15
The Statement analogizes federal judges and the President to faculty and
trustees—and how the latter should not interfere with the work of the former. See 1915
Declaration, supra note 1. The AAUP softened its stance during World War I, as neutrality to global politics was the position of choice for the time. The nascent AAUP was
tested at its core at a time when patriotism was at its highest. See Cain, supra note 13,
at 51−73.
16
342 U.S. 485 (1952).
17
Id. at 510.
18
354 U.S. 234 (1957).
19
Id. at 263.
20
Id. at 250. Arguably, even before Sweezy, institutional academic freedom was
established when the U.S. Supreme Court did not allow state legislatures to revoke
college charters. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 624−712
(1819), cited in Metzger, supra note 14, at 1315.
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The Sweezy case as well as the landmark Keyishian v.
Board of Regents21 were among the first court decisions to
introduce the notion that academic freedom was not just an
individual right, but one of the institution.22 Since then, courts
have continued to recognize not just the need for faculty to be
free to inquire, but also for the institution to pursue its mission
absent of court and/or legislative interference. This notion was
reinforced by Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, arguing that there exists an
institutional need “to be free from government interference in
its core administrative activities.”23 In Regents of University of
Michigan v. Ewing, citing Sweezy24 and Keyishian,25 the Court
noted, “academic freedom thrives . . . on autonomous decisionmaking of the academy itself.”26 And in the seminal affirmative
action case Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the importance of academic deference, stating that universities
“occupy a special niche in constitutional tradition”27 and that
they enjoy substantial “educational autonomy”28 that requires
deference to the decisions they make related to the mission of
higher education.29
In 1999, the Fourth Circuit court recognized academic
freedom as belonging to the institution—but to the detriment of
scholarly freedom in research and teaching.30 In Urofsky v.
21
385 U.S. 589 (1967). In that opinion Justice Brennan wrote, “[o]ur [n]ation is
deeply committed to safe-guarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to
all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.” Id at 603.
22
In Griswold v. Connecticut, a case regarding a constitutional right to privacy
regarding contraceptive use, the Court stated, “the State may not, consistently with the
spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right
of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the
right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read . . . and freedom of inquiry,
freedom of thought, and freedom to teach . . .—indeed the freedom of the entire university community.” 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), cited in William Van Alstyne, The Specific
Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, 404 ANNALS OF THE
AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 140, 180 (1972).
23
See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A ‘Special Concern of the First
Amendment’, 99 YALE L.J. 251, 257 (1989), (citing 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). That case upheld the state’s program to diversify the student body in the UC Davis medical school.
24
354 U.S. 234 (1957).
25
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
26
474 U.S. 214, 226 n. 12 (1985).
27
539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
28
Id. at 363.
29
See Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 2004 U. OF SAN DIEGO SCH. OF
L. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES 1, 3 (2004).
30
The rationale used by the court in this case will be used later in this paper to
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Gilmore, six faculty members from various public institutions
challenged a Virginia statute that prohibited the access of
sexually-related material from state computers without
obtaining prior approval.31 The statute used the term “sexually
explicit” to include non-obscene materials in the provisions.32
The intent of the statute was to mitigate exposure to sexual
harassment claims, but the court record showed no history of
disruption to the efficiency of the workplace nor was any
hostile work environment complaints filed.33 Arguing that the
statute violated First Amendment freedoms, the professors
contended that the material accessed from the Internet was
used in the scope of research.34
The court held that any constitutional rights of academic
freedom belonged not to the professors but to the public
universities where they were employed.35 The court concluded
that the expression was related to the scope of the
employment,36 was not a matter of public concern,37 and that
the Virginia statute was not overbroad.38 The court reasoned
that “the government is entitled to control the content of the
speech because it has in a meaningful sense ‘purchased’ the
argue that the Florida Travel Act should be struck down.
31
216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000).
32
See Kate Williams, Loss of Academic Freedom on the Internet: The Fourth
Circuit’s Decision in Urofsky v. Gilmore, 21 REV. LITIG. 493, 497 (2002). A professor who
typically gave an assignment for students to evaluate the Communications Decency Act
could no longer assign it to students because, under the statute, he could not view the
materials his students were accessing. Id. at 499. One professor was studying Pulitzer
Prize-winning Toni Morrison’s “Beloved” but could not access information on the Internet without permission because the book discusses rape and sodomy. Id. at 512. According to Williams, the Act infringes on academic freedom by compelling the university to monitor otherwise legal uses of the Internet. Id. at 508.
33
See David Hostetler, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 1 PRINCIPAL
LEADERSHIP 26 (2001); Rebecca Gose Lynch, Pawns of the State or Priests of Democracy? Analyzing Professors’ Academic Freedom Rights Within the State’s Managerial
Realm, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1061 (2003).
34
In his dissent, Justice Murnaghan noted that the Act only addressed online
material. The intent was to head off sexual harassment lawsuits, but a professor would
run afoul of the Act by researching Victorian poetry but not by leaving copies of Hustler
Magazine around the office. Id at 440, as cited in Williams, supra note 32, at 523.
35
See Lynch, supra note 33; Rabban, supra note 3.
36
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court upheld a similarly restrictive view
of public employee free speech. See 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
37
A previous line of Supreme Court cases recognizes a public employee’s right
to speak out on matters of public concern. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661
(1994).
38
Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 416 (4th Cir. 2000).
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speech at issue through a grant of funding or payment of a
salary.”39
III. CHALLENGE TO THE FLORIDA TRAVEL ACT
Though the Fourth Circuit judges in the Urofsky case would
not agree, the forefathers insisted that approval of governing
bodies should not limit American academic freedom. Arthur
Lovejoy, a professor at Johns Hopkins University who coauthored the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration, said, “the distinctive
social function of the scholar’s trade can not be fulfilled if those
who pay the piper are permitted to call the tune.”40 Professor
William Van Alstyne, preeminent scholar in the field of
academic freedom, argued in his seminal 1972 article that “[t]o
condition the employment or personal freedom of the teacherscholar upon the institutional or societal approval of his
academic investigation or utterances . . . is to abridge his
academic freedom.”41 The case in Florida involves precisely
these ominous conditions. Prior to presenting arguments as to
why the Travel Act is unconstitutional, a background of the
litigation at hand is warranted.
In 2006, then-Governor Jeb Bush of Florida signed into law
Fla. Stat. §1011.90 and §112.061, commonly referred to as the
“Travel Act,” which prohibits the use of state funds to countries
designated by the U.S. Department of State as sponsors of
terrorism42: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. The

Id. at 408.
Arthur O. Lovejoy, Professional Association or Trade Union?, BULL. AM.
ASS’N U. PROFESSORS, Vol. 24, No. 5, at 409, 414 (1938).
41
William W. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the
General Issue of Civil Liberty, 404 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 140, 147 (1972)
available at http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/792/.
42
See FLA. STAT. § 1011.90 (2010) (“None of the state or nonstate funds made
available to state universities may be used to implement, organize, direct, coordinate,
or administer, or to support the implementation, organization, direction, coordination,
or administration of, activities related to or involving travel to a terrorist state. For
purposes of this section, ‘terrorist state’ is defined as any state, country, or nation designated by the United States Department of State as a state sponsor of terrorism.”);
See also FLA. STAT. § 112.061 (2011) (“Travel expenses of public officers or employees
for the purpose of implementing, organizing, directing, coordinating, or administering,
or supporting the implementation, organization, direction, coordination, or administration of, activities related to or involving travel to a terrorist state shall not be allowed
under any circumstances. For purposes of this section, ‘terrorist state’ is defined as any
state, country, or nation designated by the United States Department of State as a
state sponsor of terrorism.”).
39
40
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Faculty Senate of Florida International University challenged
the Act in light of important research-related relationships
many of its faculty have with Cuba. The University claimed
that the statute violated 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, the Foreign Commerce Clause of
the Constitution, and First Amendment academic freedom,
speech, and expressive conduct.43 The plaintiffs argued that the
Travel Act interferes with Presidential powers, granted by
Congress, to sanction and control relationships with certain
countries.44 The state countered, arguing that academics and
students are not wholly restricted from travelling to these
countries, but must do so at their own expense.45
The Faculty Senate lost all claims in its first appearance in
the U.S. District Court, but the judge left the issue unsettled as
to how private funds and federal grants could fall within the
Travel Act’s restrictions.46 When the case reappeared in U.S.
District Court, the State of Florida stipulated that to apply the
Act to federal grants and private funds was unconstitutional.47
The court agreed and found that the ban on “nonstate” funds
was a violation of federal government powers.48 However, in
August 2010, the Eleventh Circuit overturned the prior ruling,
stating “the Act’s brush with federal law and the foreign affairs
of the United States is too indirect, minor, incidental, and
peripheral to trigger the Supremacy Clause’s—undoubted—
overriding power”49 and interpreting the Act to include
restrictions not just on direct state appropriations but also on
private donations and federal grants.50
43
Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1203 (S.D.
Fla. 2007).
44
Id. at 1204.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1209 (“It is not clear how Florida is going to deal with those donors who
might want their money back if the universities benefitting from their largesse are now
required—as a result of the Travel Act—to put unwanted (or, from the donors’ perspectives, prohibited) strings on the use of those donated funds. Given the somewhat puzzled looks of the defendants’ counsel at oral arguments when I raised issues like this
one, I doubt very much that Florida or the defendants have given these matters much
thought.”).
47
Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Bd. of Governors, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1331,
1335 (S.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l
Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010).
48
Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ., 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
49
Winn, 616 F.3d at 1208.
50
Id. (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), in
which the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts law regarding trade with
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In their briefs to the court, the plaintiffs explained that the
Travel Act has halted much of their research. Faculty are
prohibited from applying for new grants and a significant
amount of money has gone unspent from previously existing
federal grants.51 Lisandro Perez, professor of Sociology and
Anthropology at FIU, is authorized by the United States to
travel to Cuba for research.52 He is founder and director of the
Cuban Research Institute at FIU.53 He has raised $1 million in
private funds to award grants to faculty and students to travel
for research.54 Erik Camayd-Freixas of the Modern Languages
Department was awarded such a grant but, because of the
breadth of the Travel Act, cannot go because if FIU were to
write a “letter of introduction” to initiate his research, it would
involve state resources.55
Houman Sadri, associate professor of Political Science at
the University of Central Florida, had a contract with Saqi
Books to research Caspian politics; however, the work was
stalled because of the Act. He claimed that he could not
circumvent the regulations by accepting private funds because
it would compromise his neutrality and safety while in Iran.56
In another example, a professor hired by the University of
Florida’s Center for Latin American Studies declined the
position and went to the University of Virginia instead because
the Act would have prevented her from traveling for research.57
After the circuit court ruling, FIU clarified its academic
policy to state that funding travel to terrorist countries is
prohibited, “including FIU Foundation and Contract and Grant
account.”58 Further, the University has stated that it cannot
defend or be responsible for any accidents or incidents incurred
while in those countries.59 If sponsored grants included travel
to terrorist countries, directions were given to contact Division

Burma as conflicting with federal policy).
51
Faculty Senate, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1339−40.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1341.
56
Id. at 1340−41.
57
Id. at 1341−42.
58
Memoradum from Douglas Wartzok, Provost and Executive Vice President, to
FIU Community (Nov. 17, 2010) (on file with author).
59
Id.
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of Research staff to “plan alternatives to satisfy the award.”60
And, finally, faculty were advised that if their students were
conducting research that would involve travel to these
countries “to find academically sound alternatives.”61
Otherwise, “the student may have to reorganize their [sic]
project or start a new project, even if it will delay attainment of
a degree.”62
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a writ of
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in March 2011.63
Regarding the petition, an ACLU representative stated
[w]e’re asking the Court to act because this law allows Florida
to be the only state in the country with its own foreign policy
which runs over, above, and contrary to the foreign policy of
the United States. Having 50 individual states setting
individual policies for travel, commerce, and communication
with foreign nations is a clear violation of federal law not to
mention foolish and dangerous.64

In response to the writ of certiorari, the National Foreign
Trade Council (NFTC) filed an amicus curiae brief in favor of
the University.65 In it, the NFTC argued that the 11th Circuit
panel’s decision conflicted with the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council66 and further stated that
the decision “undermines the President’s ability to craft and
fine-tune a uniform foreign policy on one of the most important
international issues of our time: state sponsorship of
terrorism.”67 The NFTC compared the FIU case to Crosby
claiming that the state of Florida “burdens conduct”68 that
Congress chose not to infringe upon.69

Id.
Id.
62
Id.
63
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Fla.,
(2011) (No 10-1139), 2011 WL 970477.
64
Press Release, ACLU of Fla., Florida Law Aimed at Banning Academic and
Research Travel to Cuba (Mar. 14, 2011) available at http://aclufl.org/2011/03/14/acluof-florida-asks-u-s-supreme-court-to-hear-appeal-of-floridas-academic-research-travelban/.
65
Brief for the NFTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Faculty Senate
of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Fla., (2011) (No 10-1139).
66
Id. at 3 (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 9.
69
The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363 (2000), and Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 363 (2000), by noting
60
61
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The NFTC’s brief further argued that when a nation is
under trade embargo “[i]t is the policy of the United States to
sustain vigorous scientific enterprise through scholarly
exchange.”70 The United States has specifically excluded any
restrictions on academic travel to Cuba.71 Therefore, the
Florida Travel Act is attempting to supersede national policy
regarding relations with Cuba and other countries.72
The office of the Solicitor General also filed an amicus
brief.73 The brief highlighted the current federal law that
encourages foreign academic exchange: the U.S. Department of
Education funds study abroad through Title VI of the Higher
Education Act of 1965, the Mutual Education and Cultural
Exchange Act of 1961, and the Fulbright-Hays programs (i.e.
Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad, Faculty Research
Abroad, and Group Projects Abroad).74 The brief recognized
that the Travel Act prohibits faculty and students from
receiving the grants that are directly distributed to the
institution, thus interfering “with the accomplishment of
federal objectives.”75
Conversely, the brief filed on behalf of the State of Florida
argued that, “[w]hile federal law may permit travel to terrorist
states, and might even encourage academic travel, it cannot
mandate the use of state resources to implement such a
program.”76 Those in opposition of the Act are not arguing that
Florida must fund such travel but should not serve to block
alternative means, as the Act restricts the use of federal grants
or private funds. In its brief, the State pointed out that faculty
and students may travel to foreign countries as permitted by
that the Travel Act includes no explicit penalties for travel to those countries. See Michael John Garcia & Todd Garvey, State and Local Economic Sanctions: Constitutional
Issues, Congressional Research Service 12 (2013) (citing Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l U.
v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 at 1209, 1211).
70
Brief for the NFTC, supra note 62, at 9 (citing 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(12)
(2011)).
71
See 31 C.F.R. § 515.565(a) (2011), cited in Brief for the NFTC, supra note 62,
at 11. See also 31 C.F.R. § 515.565(d) (2011) (providing that American universities can
open bank accounts in Cuba to fund incidentals related to academic travel).
72
See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 25,808, 25,809 (May 13,
1999), cited in Brief for the NFTC, supra note 62, at 19.
73
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l
Univ. v. Fla. (2012) (no. 10-1139).
74
Id. at 13.
75
Id. at 15.
76
Brief in Opposition at 10, Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Fla. (2011) (No.
10-1139).
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the federal government but must pay their own way. This is an
incredibly dangerous supposition, as one can imagine many
important advances in knowledge that would have never been
discovered had this always been the status quo (e.g., space
exploration and vaccines).
Ultimately, in July 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court denied
the petitioners’ request for certiorari review.77 Though, as
stated above, the Solicitor General disagreed with the standing
interpretation of the Act, the office recommended that
certiorari be denied because of a lack of practicality in the
matter (i.e. the U.S. Department of Education had not funded
academic travel to any of the restricted countries in ten years).
The Solicitor General did, however, indicate that the court of
appeals should further examine whether Florida may restrict
disbursement of federal and private grants.78
IV. THE ODEBRECHT SPLIT
In May 2013, in Odebrecht Construction Inc. v. Florida
Dep’t. of Transp.,79 the 11th Circuit struck down a Florida law
that expressly addressed dealings with Cuba. In many ways
this en banc decision by the court contradicted the panel’s 2010
decision to uphold the Travel Act in the FIU case.80 Though the
court did not take the opportunity to strike down the Travel
Act, if Odebrecht were to make its way to the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Court could strike down both of the Florida laws
that restrict dealings with Cuba.
The “Cuba Amendment”81 prevents any company that does
business in Cuba from bidding on Florida public contracts
worth more than $1 million.82 Odebrecht’s Brazilian parent
company has a set of foreign subsidiaries unrelated to the
Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Fla., 133 S. Ct. 21 (2012).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 70, at 26−30.
79
Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268 (11th
Cir. 2013).
80
See Id. at 1268 (the 11th Circuit, in addressing its inconsistency with its panel ruling in Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010),
noted that the panel “recognized that ‘these traditional state concerns could be overridden’ in the event of a clear conflict with federal law or policy” citing Winn, 616 F.3d at
1208. See also Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1287, (distinguishing the Cuba Amendment from
the Travel Act because it did not penalize or prohibit travel to those countries.).
81
Fla. Stat. § 287.135, amended by 2012 Fla. Laws 196, § 2.
82
Fla. Stat. § 287.135. The statute also applies to any company related to a
company that does business in Cuba. See Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1272.
77
78
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company in Florida that does business in Cuba.83 In 2012, a
district court granted Odebrecht Construction a preliminary
injunction
to
prohibit
the
Florida
Department
of
Transportation from enforcing the Act.84 In its ruling, the 11th
Circuit agreed that the Cuba Amendment violates the
Supremacy Clause under principles of “conflict preemption.”85
“The Cuba Amendment conflicts directly with the extensive
and highly calibrated federal regime of sanctions against Cuba
promulgated by the legislative and executive branches over
almost fifty years.”86 The court went on to say that the
“Amendment also overrides the nuances of the federal law and
weakens the President’s ability ‘to speak for the Nation with on
voice in dealing’ with Cuba.”87
The U.S. government’s attention to policy with Cuba has
been long standing. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations
(“CACR”) were first promulgated by the Treasury Department
in 1963 and are still enforced.88 The CACR does not have
provisions to sanction an American company like Odebrecht for
business conducted by a foreign parent company.89 The 11th
Circuit predicated most of its decision on the Supreme Court’s
Crosby case, noting the Cuba Amendment “sweeps more
broadly”90 than federal policy, has its own penalties that “go

Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1273.
Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2012) aff’d
sub nom. Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268 (11th
Cir. 2013).
85
Odebrecht, 715 F.3d 1268 at 1272. See also id. at 1275 (“The Supreme Court
has instructed us that we may infer congressional intent to displace state law altogether ‘from a framework of regulation so pervasive that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it or where there is a federal interest so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject’”
citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 115 (1992)). Presidential
power regarding setting similar foreign trade policy dates back to 1917 with the Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
app. §§1−6, 7−39, 41−44, cited in Odebrecht, 715 F.3d 1268 at 1275).
86
Odebrecht, 715 F.3d 1268 at 1272.
87
Id. at 1272, citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381
(2000).
88
Id. at 1275, citing 31 C.F.R. pt. 515.
89
Id. at 1276 (see also id. at 1279 Canada and Brazil have complained to the
United States about the trade effects of the Cuba Amendment) (see also id. at 1280 The
European Union, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and Singapore have expressed concern about the conflicts between the Cuba Amendment and the global Agreement on
Government Procurement).
90
Id. at 1281.
83
84
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beyond federal sanctions,”91 and strips the President of power
granted him through Congress to establish policy with Cuba.
“Federal policy towards Cuba is long-standing, it is nuanced, it
is highly calibrated, and it is constantly being fine-tuned.”92
Again, though the court failed to take opportunity to
overturn the panel decision in the FIU case,93 it noted the
presidential policies, particularly of the Clinton and Obama
administrations, to loosen travel sanctions with Cuba and,
most recently with the Obama Administration, to allow
institutions of higher education to travel there.94 Florida’s
Travel Act flies in the face of those efforts.
V. THE CASE AGAINST FLORIDA
By rejecting the writ of certiorari and letting the 11th
Circuit’s ruling stand, the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed a
dangerous precedent in the 11th Circuit that enables additional
meddling in faculty-funded research. As educational
institutions are increasingly commercialized and the notion of
“academic capitalism”95 adds pressure to scholars to produce
knowledge that is a commodity, academic freedom may be
further eroded by additional state regulations that affect
academic funding.96 The presence of the “piper” that Lovejoy
warned about could loom more frequently and more
ominously.97
The Travel Act should have been struck down—at least any
interpretation that precludes the use of federal funding or
private donations98—on the basis of institutional academic
freedom. Section II highlights several precedents that establish
academic freedom not just as a right of the faculty but also of
Id.
Id. at 1278.
93
Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010).
94
Odebrecht, 715 F.3d 1268 at 1284−1285.
95
See generally SHEILA SLAUGHTER AND GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM
AND THE NEW ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATES, AND HIGHER EDUCATION (The Johns Hopkins University Press 2004).
96
In certain fields, academic agendas are influenced by the pressure to obtain
grants and patents; the promotion and reward system is set up in such a way that
many researchers are altering their research trajectory to secure extramural funding
and conform to institutional pressure to be self-supported on “soft money.”
97
See Lovejoy, supra note 40.
98
It would perhaps be difficult to argue legally that the state of Florida must
fund travel to these terrorist countries.
91
92
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the institution.99 The spending restrictions100 placed by the
Travel Act interfere with the ability of Florida public colleges
and universities’ to administer their mission of teaching,
service, and particularly research.101
Academic freedom is a “freedom” [i.e. a liberty marked by the
absence of restraints or threats against its exercise] rather
than a “right” [i.e. an enforceable claim upon the assets of
others] in the sense that it establishes an immunity from the
power of others to use their authority to restrain its exercise
without, however, necessarily commanding a right of
institutional subsidy for every object of professional endeavor
that might engage the interest of the individual professor . . . .
[A]cademic freedom would be abridged were any form of
sanction threatened against a faculty member because of any
of his professional pursuits, even assuming that the
individual’s interest pertained to a subject that the institution
declines itself to support and may thoroughly disapprove . . . .
[T]he principle of academic freedom clearly condemns any act
of institutional censure in respect to the professional
endeavors of its faculty. 102

The plaintiffs in this case are not individual faculty
members, but the Faculty Senate of Florida International
University—the concept of Freiheit der Wissenschaft (academic
self-governance) advocates against legislative meddling in the
affairs of the academy.
In addition to deference to academic decisions, courts
continually have recognized a special protection for academic

99
See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000)
(deciding whether the system to allocate student fees to campus organizations was
viewpoint neutral Justice Souter said “[o]ur understanding of academic freedom has
included not merely liberty from restraints on thought, expression, and association in
the academy, but also the idea that universities and schools should have the freedom to
make decisions about how and what to teach.” Id. at 237).
100
Similarly, Minnesota levied an ink tax against newspapers and structured its
exemption to target certain newspapers. The Supreme Court held that singling out the
press in such a way violated the First Amendment (Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)). In F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of
Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984), the Court found that Section 399 of the Public Broadcasting
Act of 1967 violated the First Amendment by directing its funding restrictions at a certain form of speech—editorialized speech.
101
See Lynch, supra note 33, at 1082 (noting: “After finding that the academic
speech lies within the state’s managerial domain, a court should ask whether the restriction of the professor’s speech is functionally necessary to accomplish the university’s goals.”).
102
See Van Alstyne, supra note 22, at 147.
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speech. In Rust v. Sullivan,103 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that the government may regulate and refuse to fund certain
messages that it finds counter to its policy.104 That ruling,
however, carved out an exception for academic speech,105 as
faculty speech is not construed to be representative of the
state106 and, per Keyishian;107 such restrictions are prohibited
by the overbreadth108 and vagueness doctrines of the First
Amendment.109 In Stanford v. Sullivan,110 the Court concluded
that attempts at censorship were precisely what Rust
excluded.111
In Board of Education v. Pico,112 the Supreme Court ruled
that there is no protection for the official suppression of ideas,
particularly when the intent of the suppression is premised on
content. It does appear that the intent of the Act was for
Florida to set its own foreign policy, particularly as it applies to
Cuba. Court record includes a quote from the sponsoring
legislator, who said that the Travel Act was “‘designed to stop
his constituents’ tax money from underwriting Fidel Castro’s
regime.’”113 This came following the arrest of two FIU
professors on charges of espionage.114 Reminiscent of
McCarthy-era censorship and even post-September 11 fear,115
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, (1991).
Id.
105
See Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 752
(1995) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 200).
106
Id. at 796.
107
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
108
The Travel Act is overly broad and vague. Would a faculty member be in violation if she wrote a letter of recommendation for a student to study in Cuba? Such an
activity involves a state employee’s time and, hence, state funds.
109
Court dicta from Rust, 500 U.S. 173 states “[t]he university is a traditional
sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government’s ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached
to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines of the First Amendment.” Id. at 200.
110
Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C.
1991) (regarding confidentiality clause that researchers must get prior approval from
the government and National Institutes of Health prior to publication).
111
Id. at 478−79.
112
Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982).
113
Faculty Senate of Florida Int’l Univ. v. Roberts, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1336
(S.D. Fla. 2008) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Faculty Senate of Florida Int’l
Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Marc Caputo & Oscar Corral,
Law Bans Travel to “Terrorist States,” The Miami Herald, May 31, 2006, DE 19 at 36).
114
Faculty Senate of Florida Int’l Univ. v. Roberts, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
115
The most notable post-September 11 case in academe was the dismissal and
103
104
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to what extent does this purported concern for national
security impede the freedom to pursue and disseminate
knowledge?116
The Pico decision also focused on the students’ right to
receive information.117 The right of students to receive
information and be educated fully hinges on faculty’s ability to
exercise their right to free inquiry, as was reaffirmed in the
AAUP’s 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure.118
In Pickering v. Board of Education,119 a landmark case that
laid the parameters by which public employees may enjoy free
speech protection, the Court stated that the government must
prove that a substantial disruption exists in order to suppress
speech.120 In 1994, the Court reaffirmed that stance in Waters
v. Churchill, holding that a higher standard existed the closer
the speech in question related to an issue of public concern.121
Most recently, the Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos122 did seem
to limit some of the earlier speech-related freedoms established
for public employees, finding that “when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the

subsequent arrest of Sami Al-Arian, professor at the University of South Florida, for
suspected connections to terrorist organizations.
116
The plaintiffs elaborated in their briefs to the court that the Travel Act prohibits faculty from applying for new grants and a significant amount of money has gone
unspent from previously existing federal grants. Faculty Senate of Florida Int’l Univ. v.
Roberts, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1349.
117
Pico, 457 U.S. at 867; see also Dana R. Wagner, The First Amendment and
the Right to Hear, 108 YALE L. J. 669 (1998). Further, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957), the Court noted that “students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding.” Id. at 251.
118 Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, BULL. AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS, Vol. 26, No. 1, at 49 (Feb. 1940) available at
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1940statement.htm
(stating
that “teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results.”).
119
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391
U.S. 563 (1968).
120
See Jeffrey S. Strauss, Dangerous Thoughts?, Academic Freedom, Free
Speech, and Censorship Revisited in a Post-September 11th America, 15 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 343, 356 (2004). The ruling in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), also extended that standard.
121
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994), cited in Fugate, supra note 13, at
211; in Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238 (2nd Cir. 1994), the Jeffries II court made a
distinction about speech made in higher education needing more protection. The Court
ruled that the dismissal of the chair of the Black Studies department at City College of
New York, because of comments he made criticizing the local public school district, was
impermissible.
122
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes.”123 Though many in education worried about the
repercussions of that decision, there arguably is an exception
carved out for faculty speech. In 2011, the Fourth Circuit—the
same court that decided Urofsky124—ruled in Adams v. Trustees
of UNC Wilmington125 that Garcetti was not intended to apply
to universities.126
First Amendment jurisprudence requires that there be a
compelling government interest if there is a restriction on
speech.127 What compelling interest exists in Florida to trump
academic freedom? Are the restrictions being made on research
in violation of the content neutrality standard?128 Even though
the Supreme Court has carved out caveats for academic speech,
is the “speech” in faculty work “purchased” by the employer?129
Because of the guidelines inherent in the tenure and promotion
process, the ability to research freely is central to and a
necessary part of faculty employment.
Another argument against the Travel Act would be the
theory of unconstitutional conditions. The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, first introduced in Lochner v. New York,130
“provides that the government may not base the granting of
public monies or other benefits on conditional terms, including
conditions which force someone accepting those terms to
surrender a right or rights otherwise protected by the
Constitution.”131 The Supreme Court has held before that just
because state funds are involved, universities cannot restrict
speech.132
Id. at 421.
Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000).
125
Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011).
126
Id. at 563−64 (ruling in favor of a professor who had been denied promotion
because of his unpopular activities as a Christian pundit).
127
See Strauss, supra note 117, at 347−48.
128
In the 1970s, the U.S. government funded research in countries in which we
had hostile relations.
129
Courts have recognized a teacher exception to the work for hire doctrine of
the Copyright Act. See e.g., Williams v. Weisser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726 (1969) (ruling
that a faculty member had a right of ownership to course notes); Weinstein v. Univ. of
Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987) (offering often used dicta against university efforts to
exert ownership of faculty creations).
130
Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905) overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726 (1963).
131 Byron V. Olsen, Rust in the Laboratory; When Science is Censored, 58 ALB. L.
REV. 299, 330−31 (1994).
132
E.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (regarding the university’s uncon123
124
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Funding faculty research in these restricted countries does
not interfere with the business of the government; if anything
the Travel Act interferes with the business of the government
by reaching beyond federal policies and regulations as well as
the last two presidential administrations’ aims to foster
educational exchange with Cuba and Iran.133 The Eleventh
Circuit in its opinion remarked that the Act does not preclude
faculty from travelling to these countries, just that it cannot be
done at the expense of the state. How dangerous is it to
presume that research will continue, particularly as faculty
salaries are being cut? The knowledge faculty and students will
have of these countries will be incorrect and outdated.
VI. CONCLUSION
Just as the country was in fear during the McCarthy Era
and Cold War, post-September 11 private citizens and public
officials alike have allowed fear to play a part in their decision
making process.134 Since September 11, professors have been
investigated for holding dangerous or unpopular political
beliefs to appease trustees and financial constituents.135
Justice Thurgood Marshall warned, “[h]istory teaches that
grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when
constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.”136 The
AAUP in its 1915 Statement warned against politics dictating
academic policy.

stitutional denial of official recognition of the Students for a Democratic Society), cited
in David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in
Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L REV. 675, 691 (1992).
133
In Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Bd. of Governors, 574 F. Supp. 2d
1331, 1353 n.33 (S.D. Fla. 2008), the court cited a speech in which then-President Bush
encouraged educational exchange with Iran. See also Karin Fischer, Obama Administration Eases Restrictions on Academic Travel to Cuba, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan.
16, 2011, available at http://chronicle.com.
134
In February 2004, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control declared that American presses could be fined up to $1 million and jailed for up
to ten years for publishing works authored in nations under trade embargoes. Beshara
Doumani, Between Coercion and Privatization: Academic Freedom in the Twenty-First
Century, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 19 (Beshara Doumani ed.,
2006).
135
Id. at 29 (speaking of incidents at Columbia and NYU of professors being critical of Israel and being labeled anti-Semite).
136
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), cited in Doug
Rendleman, Academic Freedom in Urofsky’s Wake: Post September 11 Remarks on
“Who Owns Academic Freedom,” 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 361, 364 (2002).
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Where the university is dependent for funds upon legislative
favor, it has sometimes happened that the conduct of the
institution has been affected by political considerations; and
where there is a definite governmental policy or a strong
public feeling on economic, social, or political questions, the
menace to academic freedom may consist in the repression of
opinions that in the particular political situation are deemed
ultra-conservative rather than ultra-radical.137

In the past few years, politicians have begun attacking the
“ivy walls”—a move that has popular favor among voters
suffering from the recession and unconvinced that higher
education should serve as anything but a vocational training
ground.138 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to let stand the
ruling in Faculty Senate of Florida International University v.
Winn opens the door legally for even more political attacks on
academic freedom. According to Jacques Derrida, “in a war of
propaganda, ideas are weapons. They need to be honed and
applied in service to your agenda and denied to the ‘enemy.’”139
In Florida, the legislative power is redefining the terms of
“allowable discourse.”140 As noted scholar Edward Said warned,
“[t]o make the practice of intellectual discourse dependent on
conformity to a predetermined political ideology . . . is to nullify
intellect altogether.”141 If courts continue to allow these public
attacks on academic freedom, political ideology may begin
dictating the intellectual agenda.

See 1915 Declaration, supra note 1, at 31.
Some states, including Texas and Florida, considered eliminating tenure or
linking promotion and merit to faculty evaluations and other tenuous criteria. A swell
in anti-faculty union sentiment made headlines across several states in 2011, while
voters saved the day by repealing a bill to eliminate bargaining units in Ohio. See
Kaustuv Basu, Solidarity in Ohio, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Nov. 8, 2011, available at
www.insidehighered.com.
139
David Barnhizer, A Chilling of Discourse, 50 ST. LOUIS L. J. 361, 420 (2006).
140
Id. at 421.
141
See David M. Rabban, Can Academic Freedom Survive Postmodernism? 86
CALIF. L. REV. 1377, 1381 (1998) (quoting Edward Said, former professor and founder
of post colonialism epistemology).
137
138

